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Nuisance Per Se. Macy v. Chelan' perpetuated the confusion which
has long existed about the concept of nuisance per se.
In May, 1958, Macy went with some friends to a public park maintained by the defendant town. In conjunction with a park the town
maintained a diving pier on Lake Chelan. Each year the lake varies
in depth according to the amount of water taken by the local public
utility district. The pier, 18 feet high, was safe for summer diving,
but shallow water made its use unsafe during other parts of the year.
On the day of the accident the water beneath the pier was six feet
deep. Macy's awareness of the danger was indicated by the questions
he addressed to his companion about the safety of diving.
Judge Rosellini, speaking for the court, concluded that the pier was
not a nuisance per se and, therefore, that governmental immunity was
available to the city as a defense. Consequently the supreme court
reversed the judgment which the trial court had entered on a verdict
for the plaintiff.2
The lack of harmony in the court (which divided 3-2-3) prevents
any positive statement of a holding, but the decision does raise a
question concerning the propriety of the nuisance per se label. The
nuisance concept as used in personal injury suits also deserves a reevaluation with respect to its prevalent use to avoid governmental immunity and contributory negligence.
Nuisance per se is defined as "'an act, thing, omission, or use of
the property which in and of itself is a nuisance, and hence is not
permissible or excusable under any circumstances.'" The difficulties
in such a definition are manifest. Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo
recognized this fact when he said:
We think each case must depend on its own facts for classification
as a nuisance at law, or in fact, or neither. . . . [I]f the natural
tendency of the act complained of is to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property, it may properly be found a nuisance
as a matter of fact; but if the act in its inherent nature is so hazardous
as to make the danger extreme and serious injury so probable as to be
almost a certainty, it should be held a nuisance as a matter of law ...
'59 Wn2d 610, 369 P2d 508 (1962).
2The dissent argued that the defense of governmental immunity should be waived
retroactively by virtue of the new statute, WASH. SESs. LAws 1961, ch. 136. This
note does not concern governmental immunity except to remark that the court has
still not passed on the retroactivity of the new Washington statute. For a treatment
of governmental immunity under the new Washington statute see Comment, Abolition
of 3Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 36 WASH. L. Rtv. 312 (1961).
Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 325, 154 Pac. 450, 451
(1916), quoting from 21 Am. &ENG. ENcYc. LAw (2nd ed.), p. 683.
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Locality, surroundings, methods of degree of danger, and the custom
of the country are important factors. The firing of a cannon loaded
with grape shot, if in a city or village would be a nuisance as a matter
of law, if in a remote place far from habitations of man, it might be a
of fact, and if against the face of a precipice, no
nuisance as a matter
4
nuisance at all.

The current conflict in Washington cases5 indicates that Mr. Justice
Cardozo's warning on the dangers of abstract classification has not
been fully appreciated by the Washington court. A further result is
that the Washington lawyer must contend with doctrinal distinctions
among the three categories of nuisance given judicial recognition by
the state court: nuisance per se,' nuisance in fact (or per accidens) 7
and negligent nuisance.'
As will be seen, the distinctions between the different categories of
nuisance are often analytically unsound or even nonexistent. This
does not mean, however, that the lawyer can ignore them, because
the label attached by the court to the alleged nuisance in a given
case affects significantly the burden of proof and what defenses are
available.
It was early recognized by Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in
McFarlandv. NiagaraFalls' that the claim of nuisance based on negligence in a personal injury suit is subject to the defenses against negli4 Meeker v. City of New York, 190 N.Y. 481, 83 N.E. 565, 567 (1908). See Denny
v. United States, 185 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Potashnick Truck Serv. v. City of
Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173 S.W.2d 96 (1943), and Cotton v. South Dakota Cent. Land
Co., 25 S.D. 309, 126 N.W. 507 (1910).
5 The court in Dumbar v. Dutton, 147 Wash. 224, 265 Pac. 729 (1928), implied
that a dead limb on a tree in a public park would be a nuisance per se. Contra, Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 373, 261 P.2d 407 (1953). Compare Haan v. Heath,
161 Wash. 128, 296 Pac. 816 (1931), and Turtle v. Fitchett, 156 Wash. 328, 287 Pac. 7
(1930), with State v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn.2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950).
6 State v. Boren, 42 Wn.2d 155, 253 P.2d 939 (1933) ; Puget Sound Traction, Light
and Power Co. v. Grasmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504 (1918). Some jurisdictions
use other terms in place of nuisance per se; White v. Charter Oak Construction Co.,
22 Conn. Sup. 368, 173 A.2d 509 (App. Div. 1961) (intentional nuisance) ; Krauth v.
Geller, 54 N.J. Super. 442, 149 A.2d 271 (1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129
(1960) ("true nuisance") ; Meeker v. City of New York, 190 N.Y. 481, 83 N.E. 565,
567 (1908) (nuisance as a matter of law) ; Llewellyn v. Knoxville, 33 Tenn. App. 632,
232 S.W.2d 568 (1950) ("absolute nuisance").
It should be noted that although different jurisdictions use the same label they do
not necessarily use the same definitions. Compare Potashnick Truck Service v. City
of Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173 S.W.2d 96 (1943), and McKenna v. Allied Chem. &
Dye Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 463, 188 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1959), and Humble Pipe
Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), and State v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn.2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950), with City of Erie v. Gulf Oil Corp., 359
Pa. 383, 150 A.2d 351 (1959).
7 Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960); Hardin v.
Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 Pac. 450 (1916).
s Goggin v. City of Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 894, 297 P.2d 602 (1956) ; Kilbourn v. City
of Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 373, 261 P.2d 407 (1953).
9 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
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gence, e.g., contributory negligence. However, lawyers began using
the nuisance concept in personal injury suits as a claim against governmental organizations to avoid the defense of governmental immunity." In Washington an additional requirement is imposed on
plaintiffs who attempt to avoid the governmental immunity defense,
i.e., the nuisance must not be one grounded in negligence, but must
be a nuisance per se. 11 Thus the claim in the Macy case was that the
pier was a nuisance per se."
Similarly, several jurisdictions have stated that the defense of contributory negligence is not available against nuisance per se, 13 but that
assumption of the risk is a defense. 4
The courts also hold that where a nuisance per se is shown to exist
the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant.' It should be noted
here concerning the shift in burden of proof, that such shift should
only take place where the suit involves an injunction as distinguished
from damages for personal injury.'
10 E.g.,

Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wn2d 373, 261 P2d 407 (1953).

11Ibid.
12 The claim in Macy would have to be on grounds of a public nuisance since the
plaintiff is not alleging injury to land.
13 White v. Charter Oak Const. Co., 22 Conn. Sup. 368, 173 A.2d 509 (App. Div.
1961) ; Krauth v. Geller, 54 NJ. Super. 442, 149 A2d 271 (1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 270,
157 A2d 129 (1960); Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 280 N.Y. 461, 21
N.E.2d
507 (1939).
14 Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775 (1942) ; Hill v. Way, 117
Conn. 359, 168 Atl. 1 (1933); Krauth v. Geller, 54 N.J. Super. 442, 149 A2d 271
(1959), aff'd, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A2d 159 (1960). The courts sometimes speak of gross
contributory negligence as a defense but they are then using gross contributory negligence as synonymous with assumption of the risk.
Since one may recover regardless of contributory negligence when the injuring
condition is nuisance per se, one can argue that in the Macy case the court held the
pier not to have been a nuisance per se. The concurring opinion stressed the fact
that contributory negligence should bar recovery, and the dissent was willing to remand the case for a determination on the question of negligence and contributory
negligence. Therefore, unless the Washington court has taken a new approach to the
defenses against a nuisance per se, the entire court in the Macy case agreed that the
pier was not a nuisance per se. However, the authors of the concurring and dissenting
opinions might have meant by contributory negligence what is normally called assumption of the risk. If this is what was meant, it was irrelevant whether the pier
was a nuisance per se.
15 In a suit for injunction, the plaintiff who can show that the act or condition of
which he complains is a nuisance per se thereby shifts to the defendant the burden of
proving that the nuisance will not cause enjoinable harm to the plaintiff. But if the
plaintiff succeeds in showing only that the thing complained of is a nuisance in fact,
then he must continue to carry the burden of proving that harm will result to him
of the sort for which equity gives relief. Bryson v. Ellsworth, 211 Ark. 313, 200
S.W.2d 504 (1947). But see Board of Education of Louisville v. Klein, 303 Ky. 234,
197 S.W.2d 427 (1946).
16 In suits for injunction a distinction between "nuisance in fact" and "nuisance per
se" is appropriate. Here the courts generally weigh the usefulness of the defendant's
activity and the harm from enjoining it, against the harm to the plaintiff in allowing
the condition to continue. See Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710,
82 N.W.2d 151, 159-160 (1957), and RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 933-943 (1939). When
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Conversely as to the contributory negligence defense, nuisance per
se is appropriately spoken of in personal injury suits and not in injunction suits.
A failure to recognize that the concept "nuisance per se" is used
differently in the personal injury suit as distinguished from a suit for
injunction results in confusion of the type with which Washington
is now faced.
But the Washington definition of nuisance per se, as it now stands
is entirely unworkable in suits both to recover damages for personal
injuries and to enjoin injury to or interference with the use of land.
If labels must be attached to the various kinds of nuisance actions,
it is obviously important that the labels be used consistently. The remainder of this note contains suggestions by which such consistency
might be achieved without departing from the substance of Washington
case law.
In a personal injury action the injurious conduct is either ultrahazardous, intentional, negligent, or non-negligent. Some plaintiffs
attempt to establish nuisance as an additional avenue for recovery in
order to avoid the defense of contributory negligence in what would
properly be considered a negligence action. This gambit has not always
succeeded.1 Where the conduct causing the injury is what we normally
call intentional, then the courts speak of a form of nuisance, whether it
be called "intentional," "absolute" or "per se," against which contrian injunction is sought, courts are likely to find a nuisance per se if there is great
likelihood of harm to the plaintiff, or if the harm feared would be exceedingly great.
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). Courts
are also more likely to find a nuisance per se if the condition complained of is illegal.
See Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 280 N.Y. 461, 21 N.E.2d 507 (1939) ;
Parker v. Fort Worth, 281 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) ; State v. Boren, 42
Wn.2d 155, 353 P.2d 939 (1953). Compare Motor Car Dealers' Ass'n of Seattle v.
Fred S. Haines Co., 128 Wash. 267, 222 Pac. 611 (1924). But if the condition is legal,
and especially if the legislature has provided for it, courts will be more likely to think
that the condition is necessary to society and will be reluctant to grant an injunction
(although damages might be given). See Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 903,
329 P.2d 210 (1958) (airport). But see Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. v. Sun Co., 290
Pa. 404, 138 Atl. 909, 911 (1927).
Thus in a suit for an injunction the court must take into account the surrounding
circumstances in order to say that a condition is a nuisance per se. See text accompanying note 7 supra. This is the very process which Washington repudiates in
its definition. State v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn.2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950).
As a consequence, the condition must be otherwise unlawful before the Washington
court will hold it to be a nuisance per se. State v. Boren, 42 Wn.2d 155, 253 P.2d 939
(1953); Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Grossmeyer, 102 Wash. 482,
173 Pac. 504 (1918). Thus an otherwise lawful business can never be or become a
nuisance per se. State v. Stubblefield, 36 Wn.2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950) ; Hardin
v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 P.2d 450 (1916).
The Washington court in injunction suits should redefine nuisance per se so that
it takes into account the circumstances in which the condition operates.
17 McFarland v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
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butory negligence is not a defense. 8 But contributory negligence is
not a defense against intentional conduct anyway. 9
Similarly, the Washington practice of using "nuisance per se" to
avoid the sovereign immunity defense is unnecessary and confusing.
The court indicates it will allow recovery on the basis of an activity
which is "inherently dangerous."" But this type of activity is included
within the common tort term, "ultrahazardous.'
Nor should the nuisance per se concept be applied in a personal
injury suit merely because the defendant has violated a statute. Only
where the violation of the statute precludes the defense of contributory
negligence might one say that such a concept as nuisance per se would
provide any benefit. But the existence of such a statute would suggest
that its violation involved extrahazardous activity or harmful intentional conduct. Consequently the defense of contributory negligence
would probably be unavailable anyway. Thus it is readily seen that
the nuisance concept adds nothing to personal injury litigation except
confusion.
If the courts desire to use the term "nuisance" in personal injury
suits they should refer at most to only two categories-intentional and
negligent nuisance. "Intentional nuisance" is generally used to mean
a condition created and/or maintained by the defendant from which
injury to the plaintiff is intended or substantially certain to follow.2
"Negligent nuisance" would embrace all other nuisances causing personal injury. The Washington definition of "nuisance per se," as used
in the Macy case, excludes all reference to either the intent of the defendant or to surrounding circumstances from which the existence of
an ultrahazardous activity might be inferred. As a consequence of
the restricted definition the Washington court has evidently never
18 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
1 PRossER, ToRTs § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
20
Kilboum v. City of Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 373, 261 P2d 407 (1953) (dictum).
21 PRossER, TORTS § 335 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. Freedman, Nuisance, Ultrahazardons
Activities, and Atomic Reactor, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 77 (1957).
22 For the definition of "intentional," compare De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury,
134 Conn. 630, 59 A2d 800 (1948), with White v. Charter Oak Construction Co., 22
Conn. Sup. 368, 173 A.2d 509 (App. Div. 1961).

Applying the definition of intentional nuisance to the facts of the Macy case the
question would be whether the striking of the lake bottom by the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow from the building and maintenance of the diving pier.
If so, the act of building and maintaining the pier with the consequential injury was
intentional and the nuisance was an intentional nuisance or a nuisance per se in the
sense in which it should be used in personal injury suits. One can say at most that
at certain times of the year, when the water is low, an injury might be anticipated.
If the pier were used properly, i.e., used only at high water level, one cannot say that
the injury was substantially certain to follow. Thus, the Washington court, in regard
to the question of nuisance probably reached the correct result in the Macy case.
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found the existence of a nusance per se in a personal injury suit. It is
suggested that the label serves no purpose whatever in personal injury
cases, and its use there should be discontinued. Actually, in such
cases the only relevant issues are those of ultrahazardous, intentional,
or negligent misconduct. To refer to nuisance at all is superfluous
and might well be dispensed with.
L. WILLIAm HOUGER

Prenatal Injury. Seattle-FirstNational Bank v. Rankin' is the first
Washington case allowing recovery for injuries suffered before birth
because of negligence. By recognizing a cause of action for prenatal
injuries, this jurisdiction joins the trend of recent decisions in the area.
The suit was based on a malpractice claim brought by the SeattleFirst National Bank as guardian ad litem for the minor plaintiff
against a Seattle physican. The plaintiff's mother had employed the
defendant to attend her during pregnancy and ultimate delivery. The
plaintiff was born with permanent brain damage and resulting cerebral
palsy. The complaint alleged that this brain damage was the proximate
result of the defendant's negligence, in that he failed (1) to discover
(2) to ascertain from the mother's pelvic measurements the difficulty
or impossibility of a normal delivery, and (3) to perform a Caesarean
section in sufficient time to save the plaintiff from injury. (Instead the
defendant had attempted a natural delivery.) The trial court gave
judgment in accordance with the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed.
Acknowledging that the issue of tort recovery for prenatal injuries
had never been presented in this jurisdiction, the court cited a number
of recent decisions from other jurisdictions permitting such a cause of
action,2 and chose to follow what it termed "the clear trend of recent
decisions." 3 Quoting from the New York case of Woods v. Lancet,4
which sets forth the proposition that a viable fetus has a separate
existence which should be recognized by the law, the Washington
court reasoned that its "holding does not collide with any unyielding
theoretical barrier."' The court determined that the difficulties of
159 Wn.2d

288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
2 The court, id. at 291, 367 P.2d at 838, cites five recent cases in the area. Keyes v.
Constr. Serv. Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) ; Bennett v. Hymers, 101
N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ; Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) ;
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) ; Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F.Supp. 56
(N.D. Iowa 1960).
3 59 Wn.2d 288, 291, 367 P2d 835, 838.
4303 N.Y.349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
- 59 Wn.2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 838.

